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Rose, Jones and Truex (2005) offer a valuable discussion of the issue that has
occupied center stage in IS research for decades: how to conceptualize the
relationship between technology and organizations? They raise a number of
important concerns with existing approaches to this issue, and by highlighting
these limitations, Rose, Jones and Truex challenge us to rethink our cherished
assumptions and conventional approaches to studying information systems
(IS) phenomena. 
The question of the relationship between technology and organizations is a
fundamental one in the IS literature, and goes to the heart of how we think
about, study, and develop information technologies. Whether explicitly
addressed by IS researchers in their work, or not, all IS studies reflect a parti-
cular position on this question (Orlikowski and Iacono 2001). And that posi-
tion has tended to swing, like a pendulum throughout the history of IS
research (Kling and Scaachi, 1982; Markus and Robey 1988), from those
privileging the technology (technological determinism, discrete-entity tool
view, autonomous technology), to those favoring the social (strategic choice
view, web-based ensemble models), and then onto more middle-ground
approaches as reflected in socio-technical and emergent perspectives. 
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More recent movements of the pendulum have incorporated views from
broader social formations, most particularly, structuration theory (Giddens
1984) and actor-network theory (Law 1992; Latour 1987). And it is to the
development and application of these two theories within IS that Rose, Jones
and Truex devote most of their attention. With respect to the question of
agency, they argue that both the structurational and actor-network perspectives
are lacking in different ways. Structurational treatments are seen to privilege
human agency and (inappropriately) discount technological agency, while
actor-network investigations, which treat human and technological agency
equivalently, are seen to go too far in their assumptions of symmetry and thus
as not accounting adequately for differences between humans and machines.
There is little to quarrel with these assessments. Rose, Jones and Truex
have correctly identified the different choices articulated in different theoreti-
cal viewpoints: structurational perspectives reflect the humanist tradition of
making the human subject the center of the action, while actor-network per-
spectives adopt a post-humanist stance with their decentering of the human
subject. Not surprisingly then, these different perspectives offer alternative
explanations for the development, implementation, use, and consequences of
technology in organizations. In and of itself such differences are not problem-
atic (indeed, they are inevitable), but to the extent that particular theoretical
inflections blind us to some empirically consequential influences (e.g., techno-
logical capabilities in the case of structuration research, or human intentional-
ity in the case of actor-network studies), difficulties arise in our ability to offer
insightful accounts of IS phenomena. 
The authors empirical examination of three ERP implementations suggests
that some critical influences are overlooked by adopting one or the other theo-
retical approach, and so they pose their challenge, can we do better? The
answer is, we can, and I want to suggest some ways to begin to do so. 
First, is to recognize and learn from the rich literature in the sociology of
science and technology that is grappling with similar issues. For example, the
2002 special issue of the journal Theory, Culture and Society offered a rich
debate on “The Status of the Object,” and included a number of exciting and
powerful ideas that may help us move beyond the current difficulties of estab-
lished positions in the IS field. In particular, engaging with such debates and
commentaries may help us recognize the extent to which the apparent ‘prob-
lem of agency’ is of our own making, constructed out of the ways we have
conceptually carved up the world. Latour (2004, p. 227) recently and provoca-
tively made this point: 
To distinguish a piori ‘material’ and ‘social’ ties before linking them together
again makes about as much sense as to account for the dynamic of a battle by
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imagining, first, a group of soldiers and officers stark naked; second, a heap of
paraphernalia—tanks, paperwork, uniforms—and then claim that ‘of course
there exists some (dialectical) relation between the two.’ No! one should retort,
there exists no relation whatsoever between the material and the social world,
because it is the division that is first of all a complete artefact. To abandon the
division is not to ‘relate’ the heap of naked soldiers with the heap of material
stuff, it is to rethink the whole assemblage from top to bottom and from begin-
ning to end.
This is an important caution—by privileging either the technology or the
social, we lose sight of their intermingling. But similarly, we might add, to
treat the naked soldiers and the material heap symmetrically, is to lose sight of
their differences. The challenge then is to develop a new vocabulary, a new set
of understandings that may help us address the situated entanglement of the
technology and the social. And to do so without embracing technological
determinism, without taking the technology for granted, and without allowing
the technology to vanish from view.
Second, is to experiment with different conceptual treatments of human
and technological agencies. In earlier work, Jones (1999) has proposed adopt-
ing Pickering’s (1995) notion of a ‘mangle of practice’ that recognizes “the
constitutive intertwining and reciprocal interdefinition of human and material
agency” (Pickering 1995, p. 26). In this view, neither material nor human
agency is privileged, both are seen to exhibit different influences and contin-
gences, and both are temporally emergent from ongoing practice. This seems
like a promising direction for IS studies, but I would like to offer a couple of
friendly amendments. My preference is not to speak about ‘material agency’
as that seems too similar to actor-network accounts and may inadvertently lead
us into the same difficulties of not adequately distinguishing differences
between human activities and technological doings. Instead, I find the notions
of ‘human agency’ and ‘material performativity’ more useful, helping us to
recognize the power of both without equating them. In this view, material per-
formances and human agencies are both implicated in the other (human
agency is always materially performed, just as material performances are
always enacted by human agency), and neither are given a priori but are tem-
porally emergent in practice. This view further allows us to recognize the
unanticipated conditions and unintended consequences of temporal intertwin-
ing, thus reclaiming the bases from which to make some observations about
institutional outcomes, social purposes, and human reflexivity. 
In challenging us to rethink our assumptions about core aspects of the phe-
nomena we study, Rose, Jones and Truex have done us a service. By remind-
ing us of our blind spots they encourage us to do something about them, or to
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continue to run the risk of conceptual missteps at best, and theoretical break-
downs at worst. For those of us weaned on the social construction of reality, a
recognition of the role of technological performativity may help us to
acknowledge the important ways in our realities are also inextricably materi-
ally constructed. For those of us uncomfortable with the privileging of human
agency, a recognition of different types and forms of agencies may help us to
see the many ways in which human agencies and material performances are
not the same, and to see what is lost by continuing to assume they are. For all,
such reconsiderations will require a giving up of previously closely-held (and
possibly hard-won) positions. But such a shift should not be seen as either a
retreat or a defeat. Rather, it is an opportunity to learn. As Weick (1996)
reminds us, we should hold our concepts lightly and update them frequently.
To drop our tools is to renew not just our ideas, but our identities as well. 
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